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IMPROVING THE PROCEDURE FOR
RESOLVING HEARSAY ISSUES
Richard D. Friedman *
INTRODUCTION
William Twining has perceptively remarked that a reintegration
of the laws of procedure and of evidence is long overdue.' This article
attempts to take a step in that direction. I argue that altered proce-
dures, and a widened range of procedural choices, will improve the
ability of courts to resolve hearsay issues in a satisfactory manner.
A hearsay issue arises when one party, the proponent, offers evi-
dence of an out-of-court statement to prove the truth of a matter as-
serted in the statement, and the other party, the opponent, objects.
Under current procedures, the court ordinarily resolves the issue
wholly in favor of one party or the other. Either party, if he loses on
the hearsay issue, may want to produce the maker of the statement,
the declarant, as a witness. If the proponent is prevented from offer-
ing the declarant's out-of-court statement, he may want to present her
live testimony instead. Correspondingly, if the hearsay is admitted
over the opponent's objection, the opponent may want to subject the
declarant to adverse examination; ordinarily, in such a case, the oppo-
nent must call the declarant as his own witness. Whichever party
loses on the hearsay issue ordinarily must, if he does wish to present
the declarant's live testimony, bear the burden of producing the de-
clarant as a witness. This burden is not a monolithic whole, but con-
sists of numerous different aspects. The burden may be conceived in
terms of various tasks that must be performed to produce the declar-
ant: she must be identified, located, brought to court (by compulsion
if necessary), and persuaded to testify. The burden of producing the
declarant may also be broken down into physical and financial bur-
dens. The physical burden is the onus of actually performing all the
tasks necessary to produce the declarant, while the financial burden is
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. At various points in the prepara-
tion of this article, numerous people offered helpful advice, comments, and criticisms. My
thanks to Ron Allen, Bob Axelrod, Jerry Israel, Arthur Jacobson, Avery Katz, Rick Lempert,
Mike Malinowski, Al Moore, and Roger Park. I apologize to anyone I may have overlooked.
Thanks also to David Goodhand for valuable research assistance and to Vivian James and
John Loyd for stalwart work on the diagrams.
Twining, The New Evidence Scholarship, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 295, 299 (1991).
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the responsibility for paying the costs associated with satisfying the
physical burden.
In this article, I propose two changes in the way hearsay issues
are usually resolved. First, in some circumstances courts should di-
vide the burdens of producing the declarant-for example, by impos-
ing the physical burden on the proponent and the financial burden on
the opponent. Second, no matter how the declarant is produced as a
witness, she should ordinarily testify as part of the proponent's case,
subject to cross-examination by the opponent. If the declarant does
become a witness, the admissibility of her out-of-court statement
should not be resolved until her current testimony about the underly-
ing events is received.
These changes might well support a fundamental reform of the
law of hearsay-and in a subsequent article, I will suggest that they
should.2 I will not argue for such a reform here.3 The purpose of this
article is merely to present the procedural changes just summarized
and to suggest how they may be useful. The proposed changes are,
for the most part, compatible with current hearsay doctrine, and I
believe that they would improve the way in which that doctrine is
implemented. But, because my eventual aim is to propose a wholesale
overhaul of hearsay doctrine, I will not assume in presenting the
changes that the current doctrine-or any alternative doctrine-
prevails.' In short, I am trying to establish an ideal law of hearsay,
and a first step in that enterprise is to improve the procedural context
in which courts decide hearsay issues.
For simplicity's sake, however, the analysis here will focus on
evidence that fits within the core of the standard definition of hearsay.
2 R. Friedman, Toward a Partial Economic, Game-Theoretic Analysis of Hearsay (un-
published manuscript, to be published in a forthcoming issue of the Minnesota Law Review)
[hereinafter Analysis of Hearsay].
3 Arguments for fundamental reforms of hearsay law have been made before. See, e.g.,
Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1339, 1343-54 (1987);
Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 331 (1961); Note, The Theoretical
Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1786 (1980). But see R. LEMPERT & S.
SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 520-25 (2d ed. 1982).
4 Anticipating the later article, however, I will sometimes assume as part of the hypotheti-
cals presented here that the court uses as a benchmark for decision its perception as to whether
the particular hearsay evidence before it is more probative than prejudicial. That is, if the
court believes that the evidence is indeed more probative than prejudicial, it will be inclined to
admit the evidence; this inclination may be altered, however, by taking into account such
factors as the relative abilities of the parties to produce the declarant and the time when the
proponent gave notice of intention to offer the hearsay. I believe that the arguments presented
in this article would be valid, and the procedural suggestions presented here valuable, whether
this general approach to hearsay is accepted or not. Moreover, the assumption is not essential
to any of the hypotheticals.
[Vol. 13:883
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That is, I will assume that the evidence being considered is proof of a
statement made out of court, and that the evidence is offered to prove
the truth of a matter asserted in the statement.' Most of the analysis
presented here could, I believe, apply equally well to evidence just
outside the standard hearsay definition-for example, to evidence of a
person's conduct offered to prove the truth of a belief apparently re-
flected in the conduct-or even to evidence further removed from the
usual reach of hearsay law. But the subject of this article is the proce-
dures surrounding resolution of a hearsay issue, rather than the scope
of hearsay; the latter subject can be put aside by dealing only with
evidence that is clearly hearsay.
One further limitation will also help simplify matters: this article
is not concerned, except where otherwise noted,6 with the context in
which a criminal prosecutor offers hearsay evidence against the ac-
cused. That, of course is the context in which the Confrontation
Clause of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
comes into play.7 The confrontation right raises considerations not
present with respect to other hearsay. Under current doctrine, the
ordinary law of hearsay and the law of the Confrontation Clause are
closely linked.8 I am convinced that unless this link is broken neither
subject can be developed in a satisfactory manner: the need to protect
criminal defendants' confrontation rights will make hearsay law more
restrictive than it ought to be, while the need for a practical law of
hearsay will make the confrontation guarantee less protective than it
ought to be. I believe the link can be broken by articulating the con-
frontation guarantee in terms that have nothing to do with hearsay
doctrine, and under which some hearsay offered by the prosecution
would not even present a confrontation issue.9 But that is not the
5 See FED. R. EVID. 801(a)-(c). This rule provides the basic definition of hearsay.
6 See, e.g., infra note 21 and accompanying text to Hypothetical 7 at pp. 909-10.
7 The Confrontation Clause provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
8 Under the test articulated in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), hearsay offered by the
prosecution is not admissible unless the declarant is unavailable and the evidence demonstrates
sufficient "indicia of reliability"; the second branch of this test may be satisfied "without more"
if "the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception." Id. at 66. I do not believe the
test is a workable one, and the Supreme Court has treated it rather poorly. See United States
v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986) (holding that Roberts did not intend to establish the reliability
test for hearsay other than prior testimony); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543-44 n.5 (1986)
(refusing to consider whether a confession should be considered to fit within the "firmly
rooted" exception for declarations against interest, so as to satisfy the reliability test "without
more"). Nevertheless, the Court continues to insist that it adheres to the Roberts test. See
Idaho v. Wright, I10 S.Ct. 3139, 3146-47 (1990).
9 In rough terms, I believe that the Confrontation Clause should be construed to exclude
evidence of an out-of-court statement offered by the prosecution, regardless of the declarant's
1991]
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subject I want to concentrate on here. Thus, to avoid a great deal of
complexity, this article will not deal, except briefly, with prosecution
evidence. Where I do consider such evidence, I will assume that the
Confrontation Clause presents no problem, for reasons peripheral to
the focus of this article.
Part 1 of the article uses the techniques of elementary decision
theory to lay out the current procedural context of hearsay decisions.
Parts 2 and 3 then present my proposed changes.
I. THE BASIC HEARSAY SITUATION IN TREE AND MATRIX FORM
Throughout this article, I examine a variety of scenarios fitting a
common pattern. One party, the proponent, wishes to introduce evi-
dence of a hearsay statement made by an out-of-court declarant. If
the declarant were to testify at trial to the substance of her out-of-
court statement, the testimony would have sufficient probative value
to warrant admissibility. Evidence from this particular declarant-
that is, either her out-of-court declaration or her in-court testimony-
is irreplaceable, in the sense that even if the proponent produced all
the other relevant evidence that he could, the declarant's evidence
would have substantial probative value. The proponent's adversary,
the opponent, raises a hearsay objection to the evidence. The oppo-
nent points out that the evidence is deficient, as compared to live testi-
mony, in several respects: the prior statement was not made under
oath; he cannot cross-examine the declarant; the jury cannot witness
her demeanor; and there may be doubt as to whether the declarant
even made the statement.
Figure 1 shows the hearsay game tree, albeit in somewhat simpli-
fied form. Note that before the judge has to move, the two parties
each make a move. The proponent has three choices. He may select
PRODUCE-production of the declarant as a live witness-assuming
this is an available alternative. If he does that, or if he selects Do
NOTHING (meaning that he offers neither the live testimony nor the
hearsay), the hearsay problem will not be presented to the court.
availability, if the declarant made the statement with the anticipation that it might be used in
the investigation or prosecution of a crime. Cf Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hear-
say Rule, and Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions. The State of the Relationship, 72 MINN. L.
REV. 523, 593-95 (1988) (suggesting a similar test, but applicable only to available declarants).
I would apply this test absolutely, though the accused might forfeit his confrontation right if
he wrongfully rendered the declarant unavailable-by acts such as intimidating, kidnapping,
or killing her. Under this approach, if a hearsay statement did not fit within the confrontation
protection, the accused might still assert a constitutional right to have the statement excluded
unless the prosecution produced the declarant (at least if the declarant was available), but such
assertions should be decided under general and flexible standards of due process.
[Vol. 13:883
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Only if he chooses OFFER, seeking to introduce the hearsay, might the
issue arise. Furthermore, if in response to OFFER the opponent re-
sponds with either PRODUCE or Do NOTHING, there is no dispute for
the court to resolve.
If, however, the opponent chooses OBJECT, the judge must de-
cide whether to ADMIT the hearsay or EXCLUDE it. As is frequently
recognized, if the judge decides to exclude the hearsay, the proponent
may decide to produce the declarant as a witness at trial, assuming
the declarant can be brought to court. Indeed, this inducement to
produce "better evidence" is one possible justification for some appli-
cations of the ban on hearsay. 1 A companion point is also apparent,
but I believe less consistently borne in mind: if the judge decides to
admit the hearsay, the opponent may also wish to produce the declar-
ant as a trial witness, so that the defects about which he complained
in the hearsay testimony may be eliminated. In other words, when
the declarant is available, whichever party loses on the hearsay mo-
tion must decide whether to select PRODUCE or DO NOTHING.
Figure 1 indicates the outcome at each end node, in terms of the
resulting state of evidence and the costs incurred. The evidence may
include live testimony of the declarant (LT), only the hearsay (H), or
10 See, e.g., Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REV. 227, 282-83 (1988).
1991]
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no evidence at all from the declarant (NE). The notation LT* indi-
cates that, under usual practice, the procedure for presenting the testi-
mony differs depending on whether the proponent or the opponent
produces the declarant. (Part 2 will suggest that this difference
should ordinarily be eliminated.) As for the costs, the diagram indi-
cates either 0, no outlay if the proponent is not produced, whether the
hearsay is introduced or not; -$pp, a payment by the proponent of his
costs of producing the declarant; or -$o, a corresponding payment by
the opponent of his costs of producing her. The first subscript in this
notation indicates who bears the cost, while the second indicates
which party is producing the declarant. The two parties do not neces-
sarily have the same production costs. The double subscripts are nec-
essary because, as we shall see in part 3, it may be possible for one
party to bear the costs of the other's producing the declarant."
For now we will assume that the proponent has made his inten-
tion to offer the hearsay, and that the opponent has objected, suffi-
ciently well in advance of trial that, whichever way the trial judge
rules on the hearsay motion, the losing party will not be prejudiced in
producing the declarant by the passage of time since the beginning of
the litigation; any super-saver flights that were available then are as-
sumed to be available still. This assumption will be relaxed in Part 2.
Although Figure 1 is not terribly complex,' 2 for now I will use a
I Figure 1 does not indicate the payoffs-that is, the value of each outcome-either to the
court or to the parties. For this reason, a game theorist speaking rigorously would probably
say that Figure 1 is only a game tree, and not a representation of the extensive form of the
game. See E. Rasmusen, Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory 46 (1989).
I do not believe the distinction has any significance for the purpose of this article. The payoffs
will, of course, differ from case to case. An attempt to determine the court's optimal course of
decision may be complicated by difficulties in assessing the payoffs to the court for each possi-
ble outcome. See Analysis of Hearsay, supra note 2.
12 Figure 1 is simplified in at least four respects.
First, once the parties have made their preliminary moves, but before the court rules on
the objection, the parties, and perhaps the court, must decide what information the parties will
provide to the court. A party may, for example, decide to tell the court whether it intends to
produce the declarant in the event of an adverse decision on the hearsay motion. I will address
this complexity in a separate article. See Analysis of Hearsay, supra note 2.
Second, the court is not limited to the two rulings of ADMIT and EXCLUDE. Part 3
suggests other types of rulings that the court might issue, in which the burden of producing the
declarant is divided.
Third, once the court rules, the parties may agree to alter the outcome prescribed by the
court. This possibility will be addressed in Analysis of Hearsay, supra note 2.
Fourth, Figure 1 does not show the possibility that a party will make a failed attempt to
produce the declarant. For now, we can assume that possibility away. In other words, if the
party losing on the hearsay motion is not going to produce the declarant-whether because he
cannot or will not-he will, by assumption, make that decision without spending significant
resources; if the party decides to make a genuine effort to produce the declarant, the effort will
succeed. In reality, a range of failed efforts is possible. For the most part, we would simply
HeinOnline  -- 13 Cardozo L. Rev.  888 1991 - 1992
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Figure 2
Court
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diagram that is even simpler and that will present much of the analy-
sis more effectively. Figure 2 shows the subgame that begins with the
court's decision. It essentially reproduces the bottom part of Figure
1, arranging the outcomes in matrix form.13 In this diagram, the
court picks a column, ADMIT or EXCLUDE, and the losing party picks
a row, PRODUCE or Do NOTHING. This diagram does not show the
sequence of moves. It is easy enough to remember, however, that the
court moves and then the losing party decides, in light of the court's
move, whether or not to produce the declarant.
If the judge selects the EXCLUDE column, the opponent is satis-
fied; that, after all, is the result he sought by making his objection.
But now the proponent, the party that lost on the hearsay motion, has
to determine his alternatives. The proponent would have preferred to
introduce the hearsay evidence; otherwise, there never would have
been a dispute presented to the court. Now that the court has denied
him that possibility, he has to pick between the PRODUCE row (if it is
available) and the Do NOTHING row. In other words, he has to decide
whether to produce the declarant as a witness in court (assuming that
is feasible) or to do without any evidence from the declarant at all.
The proponent may face competing considerations in making his
decision. On the one hand, evidence from the declarant may be im-
portant, perhaps even essential, to the proponent's case. On the other
hand, producing the declarant at trial may be expensive and difficult,
and perhaps not worthwhile. Indeed, occasionally production may
even be counterproductive. The proponent may be uncertain that the
declarant would adhere at trial to the substance of her prior state-
ment; he may also fear that the declarant would have a very bad de-
treat failed efforts as a negative consequence of the court's prescribed evidentiary result. As
discussed in Part 3, however, if the court does not wish simply to ADMIT or EXCLUDE, the
possibility of a failed effort may complicate the decision. See infra text following note 53; note
57 and accompanying text.
13 This is not a standard game-theory matrix, because the identity of the party picking the
row depends on what column the court picks.
1991]
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meanor or crumble under cross-examination. In some cases, such
concerns may even account for the proponent's initial decision to offer
the hearsay rather than the live testimony.
If the judge picks the ADMIT column, it is the proponent who has
gotten what he wants, and the opponent who has to select a row. The
opponent may prefer that the declarant testify in court so that the
opponent may examine her under oath and with her demeanor visible
to the factfinder. On the other hand, the opponent knows that the
proponent will not produce the declarant: if the proponent wanted to
present her testimony and was able to do so, he would have done so
on his own initiative, and given that the hearsay objection has been
denied, he is under no additional pressure to do so. Thus, the declar-
ant will testify only if the opponent bears the trouble and expense of
producing her (assuming again that producing her is feasible). The
opponent might not find that burden worthwhile.
Furthermore, even putting aside the opponent's burden of pro-
ducing the declarant, he may actually prefer introduction of the hear-
say to live testimony by the declarant. His objection might have
reflected not a preference for live testimony over hearsay but rather
the hope that, if the objection prevailed, the proponent would decide
not to produce the declarant, thus forgoing the opportunity to pro-
duce evidence from her. Perhaps, also, the opponent-if he is litigat-
ing in a nasty manner-had the subsidiary hope that if the proponent
did decide to produce the declarant he would have to incur costs in
doing so. Thus, the opponent may select the Do NOTHING row, even
if producing the declarant would be cost-free for him.
In this basic model, then, the court has to decide between two
procedures, the ADMIT and EXCLUDE procedures. 4 Whichever proce-
dure the court chooses, the losing party has to decide (assuming there
is a feasible choice) whether to produce the declarant. Under the
usual practice, the choice between ADMIT and EXCLUDE carries sev-
eral consequences:
1. The Presumptive Evidentiary Result. First, and most obvi-
ously, the court's choice determines the presumptive evidentiary re-
sult-that is, the result that will prevail if neither party does anything
more. If the decision is ADMIT, that result will be evidentiary state
H-the hearsay is admitted without the declarant being present. And
14 This article does not analyze the possibility of introducing the declarant's testimony by
deposition. That is sometimes an important possibility. But, because a party has a right to
introduce the deposition of a person in most circumstances in which testimony of the person
would be admissible but it would be difficult to produce her, see FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a), we
may, for present purposes, consider introducing a deposition as a form, albeit inferior, of pro-
ducing the declarant as a witness.
[Vol. 13:883
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if the court's decision is EXCLUDE, the immediate result is NE-
neither the hearsay nor live testimony of the declarant is presented to
the factfinder.
2. The Burden of Producing the Declarant. Second, because the
party losing on the hearsay issue-the opponent under ADMIT and the
proponent under EXCLUDE-may alter the presumptive evidentiary
result by producing the declarant, the court's decision determines
which party has the burden of doing so. Failure to satisfy that burden
means that the party losing on the hearsay issue must abide by the
evidentiary result he fought the hearsay dispute to avoid-H if he is
the opponent and NE if he is the proponent.
The burden of producing the declarant may be broken down into
two parts: the physical burden, the actual work required to procure
the declarant's testimony; and the financial burden, the costs of pro-
ducing the declarant. The burden may also be broken down another
way, by the various tasks that must be performed to procure the de-
clarant's testimony. The party who wishes the declarant to testify
must: identify the declarant; locate her; assure her continued availa-
bility for trial; compel her to appear and testify, or use means of per-
suading her to do so voluntarily (which may include, for example,
compensation for travel expenses 5 or inducements to waive a privi-
lege);16 and assure logistical arrangements for her travel to and ap-
pearance in the courthouse.
How expensive and difficult each aspect of the burden is will vary
greatly from case to case. Often, for example, there will be no doubt
as to who and where the declarant is; on the other hand, if the declar-
ant was a casual bystander to an accident who made a brief utterance
shortly afterwards, identifying and locating her may be very difficult.
Though the burden of producing the declarant may thus be con-
ceived as having various severable aspects, under prevailing practice
the burden is placed entirely on one party or the other. The court
selects either H or NE as the presumptive evidentiary result, and if the
losing party fails to produce the declarant that result will stand.
3. Procedure for Examining the Declarant. The third conse-
quence of the choice between ADMIT and EXCLUDE is determination
of the procedure for examining the declarant if she is, in fact, pro-
duced as a witness. Assuming the court selects EXCLUDE and the pro-
15 See, e.g., Comment to MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(b) (1983);
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-109(c)(l)-(2) (1980); H. DRINKER,
LEGAL ETHICS 75-76 (1953).
16 Hypothetical 7, infra p.909, provides an illustration of a case in which one party may, if
it wishes, use inducements to persuade a potential witness to testify.
1991]
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ponent does produce the declarant, the result is LT: The proponent
presents the declarant's live testimony as part of his case, and immedi-
ately after the direct the opponent has a chance to cross-examine. By
contrast, if the court chooses ADMIT, the procedure usually imple-
mented allows the proponent to offer evidence of the out-of-court
statement as part of his case; if the opponent produces the declarant,
he must wait until his case to examine her, which he must then do on
direct. This procedural result is what I have labeled LT*.
II. IMPROVING THE PROCEDURE FOR EXAMINATION
OF THE DECLARANT
We have just seen that the choice between ADMIT and EXCLUDE
has three important consequences. This Part and Part 3 suggest that
these consequences can be unbundled. The discussion is presented in
a reverse order. This Part shows that LT*, the procedure usually fol-
lowed when the opponent produces the declarant after the court
selects ADMIT, is inferior to LT, the procedure used when the propo-
nent produces the declarant after the court selects EXCLUDE. It also
shows that LT is usually best implemented if, before admissibility of
the hearsay is decided, the proponent is required to ask the declarant
for her current testimony concerning the underlying event or condi-
tion. Accordingly, this procedure should ordinarily be used no matter
how the declarant has been produced as a witness. Focusing on ear-
lier stages, I suggest in Part 3 that the burden of producing the declar-
ant should not always be imposed entirely on one party or the other.
Various allocations of portions of the burden may vary depending on
the circumstances.
A. The Order of the Parties' Examination
1. The Ordinarily Preferred Order: Testimony by the Declarant
as Part of the Proponent's Case
Assuming the declarant testifies at trial, the procedure for exam-
ining her is substantially more disadvantageous to the opponent under
LT*, the procedure yielded by ADMIT-PRODUCE, than under LT, the
procedure yielded by EXCLUDE-PRODUCE.
This would be especially true if the court adhered rigidly to the
presumptive rule that a party cannot use leading questions to examine
its own witness. Under LT*, if the opponent wishes to examine the
declarant, he must call her as a witness himself. But, as reflected in
Fed. R. Evid. 611 (c), a party should be allowed to ask leading ques-
tions, the presumption notwithstanding, when he calls "a hostile wit-
ness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party."
[Vol. 13:883
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This doctrine does not guarantee absolutely that the opponent's abil-
ity to ask leading questions of the declarant will be unaffected by who
brought the declarant to the witness stand.' 7 However, if applied sen-
sibly, it goes a substantial way to that end.
Other disadvantages to the opponent posed by LT* are more te-
nacious. One of these disadvantages is that under LT* there is a de-
lay, perhaps substantial, between the introduction of the statement
during the proponent's case and the testimony of the declarant during
the opponent's case. This delay means that for some time "the decla-
rations will be unrebutted in jurors' minds.""8 Furthermore, calling
the declarant to the stand forces the opponent to interrupt the presen-
tation of his own version of events, shifting the focus back to the pro-
ponent's version. Indeed, calling the declarant to the stand is likely to
result in a repetition of the prior statement, thus increasing its impact
on the jury.'9
The opponent may also be reluctant to be perceived by the jury
as calling the declarant to the stand.2" Under LT, when the witness-
declarant delivers testimony on direct that is damaging to the oppo-
nent, the opponent's counsel can attempt, with relatively little risk, to
undercut the testimony on cross-examination. Simply rising to cross-
examine a witness already on the stand will not necessarily raise jury
expectations very much as to what she expects the cross to yield. If
she makes any headway at all she can often give the impression that
she is not particularly disturbed by the direct testimony and is satis-
fied by the cross. By contrast, LT* forces counsel, if she wants to
examine the declarant, to act affirmatively in calling her to the witness
stand. This is bound, first, to give the jury the impression that counsel
17 If the proponent produces the declarant, the court is almost certain to allow the oppo-
nent to use leading questions. FED. R. EVID. 61 l(c) provides: "Ordinarily leading questions
should be permitted on cross-examination." If the opponent produces the declarant, though,
the court might disregard its discretion to alter the presumption against allowing a party to
lead his own witness, or it might hesitate to hold that, simply because the witness has made a
statement helpful to the proponent, the witness should be considered hostile to the opponent or
identified with the proponent. Indeed, sometimes the witness may be more closely identified
with the opponent.
18 United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 410 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting). This article
generally does not consider prosecution evidence. But Justice Marshall's dissent in Inadi is
cited because it is a useful statement of why, assuming the declarant testifies, the procedure for
examining her is less advantageous to the opponent under ADMIT than under EXCLUDE.
19 Id.
20 Part of his reluctance may arise from fear that the jury will tend to regard the declarant
as associated with the opponent, and will therefore count especially heavily evidence given by
the declarant that is adverse to the opponent. See id. at 409. Usually, though, the opponent
would be able to minimize this problem by making clear his relationship or lack of relation-
ship, with the declarant.
1991]
HeinOnline  -- 13 Cardozo L. Rev.  893 1991 - 1992
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
finds the testimony sufficiently damaging to be worth the trouble of
calling the declarant as a witness. Calling the declarant will also tend
to create higher jury expectations for what counsel hopes to accom-
plish. If the examination does not yield any significant concessions,
the jury is likely to regard it as a failure, and may put increased reli-
ance on the initial declaration. 2 In short, the opponent must recog-
nize a substantial danger that calling the declarant will be
counterproductive.
Thus, LT* makes examination of the declarant substantially less
attractive to the opponent than does LT. In many cases, the difference
will be a decisive factor in dissuading the opponent from producing
the declarant, even if he would bear no substantial burden in doing so
and even though he would gladly, and perhaps beneficially, cross-ex-
amine the declarant under LT. And, afortiori, if there is a significant
burden in producing the declarant, the opponent will be less willing to
bear it if only the less attractive form of examination provided by LT*
procedure is available.
If proof were needed that the procedure for examining the de-
clarant is substantially less attractive to the opponent under ADMIT
than under EXCLUDE, it can be provided informally by answering two
simple questions. First, after a party finishes examining his witness on
direct, how often does the opponent rise to ask at least a few questions
on cross? Most often. Second, when a party introduces the hearsay
statement of a declarant, even one readily available, how often does
the opponent call the declarant to the stand as his own witness? It
does happen, but rather infrequently.
The loss of the opponent's examination of the declarant, because
the opportunity offered is too ineffective and risky as compared to
another opportunity that might have been offered, is an unambiguous
loss of potentially useful information for the truth-determining pro-
cess. Thus, insofar as the choice of procedure affects whether and
how the opponent examines the declarant, LT* is inferior to LT.
21 In his dissent in Inadi, 476 U.S. at 410, Justice Marshall pointed out an additional draw-
back of the ADMIT procedure to the accused in a federal criminal prosecution. Under 18
U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1989), "[a]fter a witness called by the United States has testified on direct
examination," the accused has a right to obtain any prior statements of the witness in the
government's possession. The accused has no such right with respect to his own witnesses.
Justice Marshall did not consider the possibility that, if the defense calls the declarant as a
witness solely to impeach a statement offered by the prosecution, the declarant should be con-
sidered a Government witness for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3500. This interpretation would be
plausible, and would serve the same purpose as FED. R. EvID. 806. Rule 806 recognizes that,
when one party introduces an out-of-court declaration for the truth of what it asserts, the other
party should be able to challenge the credibility of the declarant as if the declarant had testified
for the proponent.
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But that is only half the story. We must also consider the effect
on the proponent. If LT applies, the proponent may sometimes de-
cline to produce an easily available declarant, even though the propo-
nent would gladly introduce the out-of-court declaration if LT*
applied. The proponent may hesitate--even assuming production of
the declarant would create no significant burden-because he fears
that live testimony would be counterproductive, either because the
witness will have an unpersuasive demeanor or fail to adhere to the
prior statement, or because the more potent form of examination
available to the opponent under LT may prove to be effective. In
short, the proponent may decline to produce the declarant because he
fears that too much exposure will reveal the weakness of the evidence.
The loss of evidence for such a reason seems to be no loss to the truth-
determining process.
This means that the manner of examining the declarant under
LT, the procedure yielded by EXCLUDE-PRODUCE, is ordinarily supe-
rior to that under LT*, the procedure usually yielded by ADMIT-PRO-
DUCE. But that does not mean that if the court wishes to impose on
the opponent the burden of producing the declarant, as under ADMIT,
it must also conduct an inferior procedure for examination if the op-
ponent does produce the declarant. The placement of the burden of
production and the procedure for examining the declarant may be
unbundled.
Even if the court decides to impose the burden of producing the
declarant on the opponent, it may-and ordinarily should-provide
that if the opponent does produce the declarant, the testimony will be
presented in the manner of LT. Thus, a decision to ADMIT the hearsay
should usually be taken as provisional only, indicating that the hear-
say will be admitted if the opponent does not produce the declarant in
timely fashion. If the proponent does timely produce the declarant,
the proponent must put the declarant on the stand as part of his case,
or forgo the right to use the out-of-court declaration. If the declarant
does take the stand, then, as suggested below, her testimony given
from her current memory might render admissibility of the prior dec-
laration unnecessary. In any event, once the declarant testifies on di-
rect for the proponent, the opponent may cross-examine her in
ordinary course.22
22 This proposal bears some resemblance to the so-called rule of completeness. That rule,
as expressed in Fed. R. Evid. 106, provides that "[w]hen a writing or recorded statement or
part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that
time of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be
considered contemporaneously with it." One aspect of the proposal presented here is that, if
the court decides to admit the hearsay but the opponent timely produces the declarant as a
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In other words, the modification proposed here alters LT*, the
evidentiary result of ADMIT-PRODUCE, making it identical to LT, the
evidentiary result of EXCLUDE-PRODUCE. And this means that the
outcome of the ADMIT-PRODUCE cell of the basic matrix, Figure 2, is
identical to the outcome of the EXCLUDE-PRODUCE cell, except that
in the former case the opponent bears the burden of producing the
declarant and in the latter case the proponent does.23
Because it removes artificial barriers to the production of proba-
tive evidence, this rather simple modification makes ADMIT substan-
tially more appealing to the court and the opponent than it is as now
usually implemented. I will therefore generally assume that the pro-
cedure yielded by ADMIT-PRODUCE is LT rather than LT*.24
Furthermore, if LT is appropriate when the opponent bears the
entire burden of producing the declarant, it is, a fortiori, appropriate
when only part of the burden is imposed on the opponent, as under
procedures to be suggested in Part 3. In short, if the declarant testi-
fies at trial, then however that came about-however the burden of
producing her was allocated, and whoever brought her to court-it is
ordinarily the proponent who should examine her first. The opponent
should then be given the opportunity to cross-examine. 5
This is not necessarily good news to the opponent. If the court
knows that it is not compelled to relegate the opponent to an inferior
mode of examination simply because it imposes on the opponent all or
witness, the opponent need not wait until he presents his own case to subject the declarant to
adverse questioning. Rather, the opponent's questioning of the declarant "ought in fairness to
be considered contemporaneously with" presentation of the hearsay statement.
23 That, of course, may be a significant difference. Under the ADMIT procedure, whether
modified or not, the opponent-rather than the proponent as under the EXCLUDE procedure-
bears not only the risk of being unable to produce the declarant but also the cost of a successful
or unsuccessful attempt to produce her.
24 This modification may appear to be less necessary for bench trials, because the inadequa-
cies of the ADMIT procedure for examination of the declarant may be less damaging to the
opponent. On the other hand, even in a bench trial, the opponent might be hesitant to call the
declarant to the stand without high expectations that doing so will be productive. If the oppo-
nent had to ask for the modified procedure, the request might be self-defeating, because it
would tend to reveal the opponent's concerns to the trial judge. It is better to give the oppo-
nent the benefit of the modified procedure as a matter of standard practice, without his needing
to ask.
25 If the opponent does not object in a timely fashion to the hearsay, or is unreasonably
slow in producing the declarant after the court rules ADMIT, the proponent should not be
prejudiced; he should be allowed to introduce the hearsay as part of his case. But if the oppo-
nent later produces the declarant-say, in the middle of his own case-he probably still ought
to have the option of having the proponent put her on the stand and examine her first. Occa-
sionally, the proponent might decline, saying that had he been given the choice he would have
forgone use of the hearsay statement rather than put the declarant on the stand. In such a
case, the proponent probably should be taken at his word. He should not be compelled to put
the declarant on the stand-but the hearsay should be stricken from the record.
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part of the burden of producing the declarant, then imposing that bur-
den on the opponent becomes a more appealing choice for the court.
And this makes it less likely that the court will simply exclude the
hearsay.
2. Nonuniversality of the Ordinarily Preferred Rule
I have not suggested that LT always replace LT*, because some-
times little would be gained but some extra bother. Consider this
hypothetical:
HYPOTHETICAL 1: Paul, in litigation against Otto, introduces his
testimony of a statement made by Otto himself Otto objects, saying
that before the statement is admitted, Paul should put Otto himself
on the stand. The court is confident that Otto will testify in his own
behalf in any event, and that, whatever his testimony will be, the
hearsay statement should be admitted.
The court might still decide that it is better to hear promptly
"from the horse's mouth," rather than to let Paul's version of Otto's
statement remain unrebutted, except by cross-examination, for an ex-
tended period.26 On the other hand, in this case Otto's counsel pre-
sumably will not be dissuaded from putting the declarant on the
stand, nor from asking crucial questions, by fear that the examination
will be unproductive or even counterproductive; here, the declarant is
her client, and he will testify in his own behalf in any event. In such a
case, the issue is essentially whether the proponent can introduce the
hearsay immediately, in the way he wishes, or whether he must first
put the adverse party on the stand in the middle of his own case. The
court might well decide that it is better to let each party present his
own version in sequence, and in the way he wishes, rather than to
interrupt Paul's presentation-and perhaps even his testimony-by
testimony of his adversary, albeit limited in scope. Thus, the court
might adhere in this case to the LT* procedure.
This hypothetical includes at least two conditions that seem gen-
erally essential for LT* to be preferable: first, that the hearsay state-
ment would be admissible irrespective of what the declarant might
reasonably be expected to testify; and second, that use of the proce-
dure would not seriously hinder the opponent's counsel in examining
26 I do not necessarily disagree with the categorical rule, skillfully defended in Park, The
Rationale of Personal Admissions, 21 IND. L. REV. 509 (1988), exempting personal admissions
of party opponents from the hearsay rule. But it is a separate question whether the statement
should be introduced before the party who made the statement has testified from current mem-
ory, and perhaps long before that party has had a chance to deny the earlier statement or to
attempt to explain it away. As to this question of procedure, at least, it seems to me that a
categorical rule may be unwise.
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the declarant. Because I am interested here in how altered procedures
may affect the resolution of hearsay issues, I will assume that these
conditions do not both hold; when they do not, LT is almost always
preferable.
3. The Problem of Notice
The ADMIT procedure, as modified to incorporate the LT proce-
dure for examining the declarant, is more attractive to the court than
is the ordinary ADMIT procedure. Thus, the proponent may find him-
self under pressure to give ample notice of his intention to use the
hearsay, long enough before trial so that the opponent could produce
the declarant in time for her to testify during the proponent's case.
The proponent might want to give enough notice that denial of the
hearsay objection-imposing on the opponent the burden of produc-
ing the declarant-is as attractive an option as possible to the court.
And if the result is that the opponent does indeed produce the declar-
ant, the proponent will often be well pleased; often the proponent
would prefer the declarant's live testimony to her hearsay statement,
but offers the hearsay statement because he does not want to incur the
cost and difficulty of producing her.27 In some other cases, however,
27 The proponent might try a game-playing maneuver in an attempt to shift costs from
himself to the opponent. Suppose that the proponent would prefer the live testimony of the
declarant to evidence of her hearsay statement, even after taking into account the costs of
producing her as a witness, but that he is sure that if he announced his desire to offer the
hearsay the court would rule the evidence admissible and that the opponent would produce the
declarant. The proponent might thus decide to offer the hearsay, wait for the opponent to
produce the declarant, and then offer the declarant's testimony, without having to incur the
cost or trouble of production. I do not find this prospect particularly troubling. The ploy
would work only if the opponent has a conflicting perception-believing that it is he (rather
than the proponent) for whom live testimony would be preferable to admission of the hearsay,
and so believing strongly enough to warrant the cost of producing the declarant. If the oppo-
nent does not make this calculation, then he would do nothing, allowing the hearsay to be
admitted and so rendering the proponent's gambit counterproductive. Only rarely could the
proponent have enough confidence in the opponent's calculation as to justify taking the
chance.
The proponent might, however, try an apparently cost-free variation-first announcing an
intention to offer the hearsay, and then, if the opponent does not take the bait by producing the
declarant, producing her himself. This variation still will not help the proponent unless the
opponent decides that he, not the proponent, is better off with live testimony than with the
hearsay, and by enough to warrant the extra cost. If the opponent does make that calculation,
then he has been bluffed into bearing costs of producing the proponent's evidence that the
proponent would have been willing to bear; if the opponent does not make that calculation, the
proponent has lost nothing. This tactic might be considered disingenuous, because the initial
offer of the hearsay conveys an intention not to produce the declarant. If the court were to find
this tactic disturbing, it might prevent the tactic from being effective by barring the proponent,
who had purportedly sought to introduce the hearsay, from introducing the live testimony
unless he is able to show good reason for his change of mind. Indeed, the court, in issuing an
anticipatory ruling that the hearsay is admissible, might require the proponent, before the
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the proponent prefers to "stand pat" with the hearsay statement,
rather than risk the live testimony. In such a case, the proponent
might hesitate to give sufficient notice, because it might make victory
on the hearsay objection less valuable to him-that is, the opponent
might take advantage of the notice and produce the declarant. And
this, of course, tends to be precisely the type of case in which it is
most important that the proponent give sufficient notice.
The court might strengthen the proponent's incentive to provide
notice. Perhaps the most effective way the court could do this is by
imposing on the proponent any loss or risk created by the insuffi-
ciency of notice. Consider a second hypothetical.
HYPOTHETICAL 2: Paul Proponent is at trial against Otto Oppo-
nent. On Tuesday afternoon, without giving prior notice, Paul offers
evidence of a hearsay statement by declarant Dawn Day. Had Paul
given prior notice of his intention to offer Dawn's statement, the
court would have selected the modified ADMIT procedure-imposing
on Otto the burden of producing the declarant, admitting the hear-
say if Otto did not produce her, and requiring Paul to put Dawn on
the stand as part of his case, or forgo use of the hearsay, if Otto did
produce her. Otto says that, rather than allowing Dawn's statement
to be admitted without subjecting her to adverse questioning, he
would indeed want to produce her as a witness. He cannot do so
before Paul finishes presenting his case-in-chief later that day. Af-
ter Paul is finished, Otto will take all day Wednesday, and perhaps
part of Thursday, to present his evidence. And, because Dawn lives
in Courthouse City, Otto can subpoena her to testify as early as
Wednesday afternoon or Thursday morning.
The court might well adhere to its inclination to impose on Otto
the burden of producing the declarant, but give Otto some extra time,
because of Paul's failure to give earlier notice. Otto cannot produce
Dawn before the close of Paul's case-in-chief, but he could do so
before the trial ends, without the need for a continuance. Thus, the
court might rule that, unless Otto produces Dawn by Thursday morn-
ing, the hearsay evidence will be admitted. If Dawn does appear on
Thursday morning, then after Otto has finished presenting his case,
Paul may put Dawn on the stand as his own witness. If Paul declines
to do so, the hearsay will be excluded. This ruling means that the
presentation of Paul's case is broken up, and put out of the order he
opponent has undertaken any efforts, to state whether or not he intends to produce the declar-
ant if the opponent does not. On the other hand, the court might conceivably be willing to let
the parties play a bluffing game, which is likely to result in the burden of producing the declar-
ant being borne by the party most eager for her live testimony.
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had wished-but he could have prevented that by giving earlier notice
of his intention to present Dawn's evidence.
The problem created by the proponent's delay in giving notice
will not always be so easily solved. Sometimes, the delay may make it
more difficult to produce the declarant at all before the end of the
trial, even if the trial were extended by a reasonable continuance. In
such a case, as suggested in Part 3, the court might respond by impos-
ing upon the proponent the incremental burden of producing the de-
clarant created by the delay-even though, if notice had been
adequate, the court would have imposed the entire burden of produc-
ing her on the opponent. In other words, the court might make the
proponent bear the risk that the proponent cannot be produced in
time for trial.
For now, though, the point I want to emphasize is this: If,
notwithstanding lateness in notice, the court is inclined to impose on
the opponent all or part of the burden of producing the declarant, and
if the opponent satisfies that burden, then the declarant still ought
ordinarily to be put on the stand by the proponent, not by the oppo-
nent. If the proponent's lateness in giving notice means that the op-
ponent cannot reasonably be expected to produce the declarant, and
as a result the declarant will not testify until well after the proponent
has finished putting in his other evidence, so be it; that is a cost the
proponent has brought on himself.
B. The Order of the Proponent's Questioning
In Section A, I have contended that, however the declarant is
brought to the stand, he ought ordinarily to be examined first by the
proponent, and then cross-examined by the opponent. But given that
the declarant is on the stand, should her hearsay statement be
admitted?
The question of whether, and to what extent, prior statements of
a witness should be treated as hearsay has generated a great deal of
controversy. The traditional view is that a prior statement offered to
prove the truth of a matter it asserts is hearsay, notwithstanding that
the declarant is a witness subject to cross-examination.28 Others-
including Wigmore,29 the drafters of the Model Code of Evidence,3"
and at least two states3 '-take the contrary view, that the purposes of
28 See, e.g., State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 285 N.W. 898 (1939).
29 3A WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018, at 996 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
30 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 503(b) (1942).
31 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(a) (1983); see Jett v. Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d 788 (Ky.
1969). Note also that under Indiana decisions, an out-of-court declaration may be considered
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the hearsay rule are satisfied if the declarant is present and subject to
cross-examination.
The Federal Rules of Evidence take a hedged view. The Rules
do not generally exempt a statement from being treated as hearsay
simply because the declarant is a witness subject to cross-examination.
Rule 801(d)(1) does, however, create exemptions for three important
categories, in which
the statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony,
and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a
trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, or (B) consis-
tent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an ex-
press or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication
or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a
person made after perceiving the person .... 32
In short, the Federal Rules set out two categories of statement
(clauses (A) and (B)) that are exempted from the hearsay rule in light
of the declarant's testimony, and one category (clause (C)), that is
exempted irrespective of the nature of the declarant's testimony. All
other prior statements are treated as hearsay, and so presumptively
excluded, irrespective of the declarant's testimony.
I do not offer here a comprehensive solution for ruling on hear-
say objections to prior statements by witnesses. Rather, I make a
simple procedural suggestion: the hearsay statement should not ordi-
narily be introduced, and its admissibility should not be decided, until
the proponent has first asked the declarant-witness for her current
testimony about the underlying event or condition that was the sub-
ject of the hearsay statement.
If the court admits the hearsay first, before hearing the declar-
ant's current testimony concerning the underlying event or condition,
it leaves a potential problem unsolved. It may be that, for a manipu-
lative reason, the proponent wishes to introduce the prior statement
instead of (rather than in addition to) the current testimony. The pro-
ponent might want to avoid asking about the declarant's recollection
because he is afraid that she would depart, in a way unfavorable to
him, from the prior statement. Or perhaps he knows that the declar-
not to be hearsay if the declarant testifies, is subject to cross-examination, and acknowledges
making the statement; it appears that the declarant must also testify to the underlying facts or
testify that she cannot recall those facts. See Campbell, The Indiana Supreme Court Refines
the Patterson Rule, 28 REs GESTAE 417 (1985).
32 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(l). Some states' rules are more generous than the federal rules in
that they exempt from the hearsay rule any prior inconsistent statement of a witness who is
subject to cross-examination, without the limitations of rule 801(d)(l)(A) on the circumstances
in which the statement was made. See, e.g., Gibbons v. State, 286 S.E.2d 717, 721 (Ga. 1982).
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ant would not testify in a convincing manner about the event or con-
dition, or would crumble under cross-examination. If the declarant
were eager to help the proponent's case, however, she might have no
trouble testifying that she made the prior statement, and then retreat
behind a stone wall of "I don't remember" when asked about the un-
derlying events.
Of course, as I suggested earlier,33 there is a similar possibility
that the proponent is acting in such a manipulative way, hiding poten-
tially harmful evidence, whenever he offers a hearsay statement rather
than producing a declarant who could be brought to court. Neverthe-
less, hearsay statements by absent declarants, even available ones,
often are admitted, and should be. Is there any difference when the
declarant is on the stand? I believe there is. When the declarant is
absent, the impossibility of producing her, or the burden that doing so
would impose on the proponent, may support a decision to admit the
hearsay. The decision may reflect a judgment in the particular in-
stance that, if the declarant is to be produced, the opponent should
bear the burden of doing so. But if the declarant is already on the
witness stand, any burden that might be imposed on the opponent has
been satisfied, and there is no remaining burden at all on the propo-
nent to secure the declarant's current testimony.34 The court might as
well eliminate the possibility of manipulation by requiring the propo-
nent to ask the declarant-witness to state her current recollection
before the court considers the hearsay statement.
Often, of course, the proponent wishes to introduce the hearsay
declaration in addition to (rather than instead of) the declarant-wit-
ness' current testimony. Sometimes, though, the hearsay statement
will just show that the witness has said before what she has just testi-
fied to from the witness stand. Where this is so, the hearsay statement
is probably nearly useless, and ought not to be allowed.35 Often, how-
ever, the hearsay statement adds a great deal to the current testimony.
The earlier statement may be more detailed than the current testi-
mony, because it reflects a fresher memory. Or, if it is consistent with
33 See supra at 895.
34 Of course, if the declarant may assert a privilege, there is a remaining aspect of the
burden-persuading her to waive the privilege-even though she is physically on the stand. I
am using "on the witness stand" as a shorthand statement for "on the witness stand, ready,
able, and willing to testify." A declarant who does not meet this standard may be deemed
effectively absent, whatever her physical location.
35 There is a general rule against bolstering the witness' credibility before it has been at-
tacked, but here another consideration applies. Merely proving that the witness has made the
same statement repeatedly proves nothing about her credibility, or the accuracy of the state-
ment. Of course, the circumstances in which she made the prior statement may support her
credibility.
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the current testimony, it may help rebut a contention that the witness
has given false testimony because of some earlier-occurring failure of
testimonial capacity; to the extent that the asserted failure occurred
after the earlier statement, the asserted failure cannot explain how the
witness has given the account that she has in her testimony. Or, if the
prior statement is inconsistent with the current testimony, the state-
ment may not only help impeach the current testimony, but also give
another rendition of events that ought to be presented to the jury. In
any event, the incremental probative value of the earlier statement,
and any dangers it poses, are more easily assessed after, rather than
before, the declarant has testified from current memory.
Moreover, no significant harm can be done by asking the declar-
ant-witness for her current testimony before admitting the hearsay
statement. Ordinarily, any admissibility problems that beset the cur-
rent testimony would also beset the hearsay. Occasionally, the declar-
ant's memory of the underlying event or condition may be too vague
to warrant admissibility, whereas the hearsay statement may repre-
sent a fresh recollection. But even where this is so, there is no real
harm done, and some potential benefit to be gained, in asking the wit-
ness first for her current recollection. Taking that testimony will not
use up a significant amount of time nor introduce prejudicial informa-
tion, but it might help in evaluating the hearsay statement, if that
statement is eventually admitted.
C. Summary of the Proposed Procedure
for Examining the Declarant
The proposals made in this Part may be summarized briefly. If
the declarant of a hearsay statement testifies, then no matter how she
may have been brought to court, the proponent ordinarily ought to
put her on the stand first, as part of his case. Once she is on the stand,
the proponent ought to ask her first for her current testimony about
the statements underlying events or conditions. Only then, if at all,
should the hearsay statement be admitted. When the proponent is
finished examining the declarant, the opponent should then be al-
lowed to cross-examine her in ordinary course.
Under this system, the court's ruling with respect to a hearsay
statement by a declarant who is absent but who could be brought to
court is, in a sense, tentative. The decision to ADMIT or EXCLUDE the
statement indicates only what will be done if the declarant is not
timely produced as a live witness. If the decision is to EXCLUDE, but
the proponent timely produces the declarant, he can put her on the
stand and examine her. Perhaps the court will decide after hearing
1991]
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her current recollection that in light of her testimony the hearsay is
admissible. And if the initial decision is to ADMIT, the opponent ordi-
narily should have until a prescribed time, before which the hearsay
should not be admitted, to produce the declarant. If the opponent
does produce the declarant by that time, the proponent will put the
declarant on the stand or forgo use of the hearsay. After her current
testimony is taken, the court can then evaluate whether, in light of
that testimony, the' declarant's hearsay statement ought to be
admitted.
III. DIVIDING THE BURDENS: THE COURT'S
CHOICES OF ALLOCATION
Part 2 discussed the procedure that ought to be followed when
the declarant is produced as a witness at trial. Part 3 takes a step
back, and examines the choices the court has in allocating the burden
of producing the-declarant.
As discussed in Part 1, various tasks must be performed to en-
sure a declarant's testimony in court. The declarant must be identi-
fied, located, brought to court, and persuaded, by either voluntary or
compulsory means, to testify. The simplest arrangement is for the
entire physical burden of producing the declarant's testimony, and
also the financial burden associated with the physical burden, to be
imposed on one party or the other. The burdened party decides
whether or not to produce the declarant as a witness, where doing so
is feasible, and then, if he decides in the affirmative, does what is nec-
essary to produce her and absorbs the cost of doing so.36 But the
simplest arrangement is not necessarily always the best.
A. Dividing the Physical Burden
1. Hypotheticals and Possible Decisions
In some cases it makes sense to divide the physical burden of
producing the witness, imposing part on one party and part on the
other. Consider the following hypotheticals.
HYPOTHETICAL 3: Proponent Propco offers, for a hearsay purpose,
a memorandum evidently made by one of its employees, who is not
identified on the face of the memo. The court is inclined to admit
the memo, because it believes that the memo would be more proba-
36 I will assume throughout that a party cannot be required against his will to meet the
financial burden of producing the declarant. That is, if the court imposes the financial burden
on a party, and the party does not wish to pay what it costs to produce the declarant, he does
not have to; he may, however, suffer adverse evidentiary consequences.
[Vol. 13:883904
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tive than prejudicial. 3 7 But it also recognizes a chance that, if oppo-
nent Oppco had a chance to subject the declarant, whoever she is, to
adverse live questioning, the declarant's version of events would not
be as damaging to Oppco as now appears-if for no other reason
than that Oppco might be able to clear up some ambiguities in the
memo. Furthermore, the court is confident that Propco could, with
some work, identify and locate the declarant but that opponent
Oppco could not, at least not without great difficulty.
The court might impose on Propco the burden of identifying and
locating the declarant, and on Oppco the other aspects of the burden
of producing the declarant. Thus, if Propco does not provide Oppco
with the name and address of the declarant, the hearsay is excluded.
If Propco does provide Oppco with the name and the address, the
hearsay is admitted-at least, unless Oppco produces the declarant.
Figure 3a
Court
SPLIT
BURDEN(PROPONENT
FIRST)
Proponent
DO NOTHIN PATPOUE
DOPNRTPRODUCE
H LT
0$0
Figure 3a is a diagram showing in general terms how this ruling,
splitting the burden between the two parties, might work. Figure 3a
presents one "subgame," in addition to ADMIT and EXCLUDE, that the
court may select when it is called on to decide the hearsay objection.
Under this subgame, called SPLIT BURDEN (PROPONENT FIRST), the
proponent must first decide whether to choose Do NOTHING or PART-
PRODUCE. If he chooses Do NOTHING, the hearsay is excluded and
the declarant is not produced (evidentiary result NE). If he chooses
PART-PRODUCE, he commits himself to performing a portion of the
37 See supra note 4.
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burden designated by the court, and the opponent must then decide
whether to Do NOTHING or PART-PRODUCE. If the opponent decides
to Do NOTHING, the hearsay is admitted (H) without cost to either
party. (Although the proponent committed himself to performing
part of the burden of producing the declarant, the opponent's decision
has rendered that commitment moot.) If the opponent decides to
PART-PRODUCE, then the declarant will in fact be produced as a live
witness (LT),38 and each party will bear the costs of its portion of the
burden of production (indicated by the subscripts p' and 0', read as
"p-prime" and "o-prime" respectively).
HYPOTHETICAL 4: Propco wants to introduce a statement made by
one of its former employees, Deborah Decker. Apart from the memo
itself, Oppco has no information at all concerning Decker. Propco
knows Decker's address as of the time she left its employ, three years
ago, but does not know of her subsequent whereabouts. Further-
more, no current employees of Propco have any information that
would help locate Decker.
The court might require Propco, as a precondition to admission
of the hearsay, to provide Oppco with Decker's last known address,
before imposing on Oppco the remainder of the burden of producing
her. If Propco does give the address to Oppco, Oppco could try to
find Decker and produce her as a witness. If Oppco fails to do so, the
hearsay statement will be admitted. This solution, like that suggested
with respect to Hypothetical 3, is an example of SPLIT BURDEN (PRO-
PONENT FIRST).
HYPOTHETICAL 5: Paul Proponent, in litigation with Otto Oppo-
nent, wishes to introduce for a hearsay purpose a statement made by
a friend of Otto's in a conversation with Paul and Otto. The court is
inclined to exclude the statement, imposing on Paul the burden of
producing the declarant. Paul, however, does not know the name or
identity of the declarant. If Paul had known well enough before
trial that he would want to present the statement, he could have, by
means of either interrogatories or deposition questions, required Otto
to provide the name and address of the friend. But the relevance of
the statement only became apparent during trial, as a result of evi-
dence introduced by Otto.
It is too late for further discovery--or, perhaps more accurately,
the narrowness of the information that Paul seeks, and the presence of
the parties before the court, make formal discovery unnecessary. The
court might rule that, unless Otto provides Paul with the name and
address of the declarant, the hearsay will be admitted. The court
38 Recall that, under the procedure proposed in Part 3, LT, rather than LT*, is ordinarily
used no matter how the declarant is produced as a witness.
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might further rule that, if Otto does give Paul the name and address,
the hearsay will be excluded, at least unless Paul produces the declar-
ant.
Note that the solution suggested here reverses the process sug-
gested in connection with Hypotheticals 3 and 4; here, it is the oppo-
nent, Otto, who must choose first, by providing the name and address
of the declarant. Figure 3b presents this reverse process, SPLIT BUR-
DEN (OPPONENT FIRST), in general terms. Like the PROPONENT
FIRST variation, this is an alternative subgame to ADMIT and EX-
CLUDE. When the court chooses this ruling, the opponent must make
the first decision. If he decides to Do NOTHING, the hearsay is admit-
ted (H). If he chooses PART-PRODUCE, the proponent must then
choose between PART-PRODUCE and Do NOTHING. If the proponent
likewise chooses PART-PRODUCE, the result will be LT, the same re-
sult that would occur under SPLIT BURDEN (PROPONENT FIRST) if
both parties chose PART-PRODUCE. If the proponent decides to DO
NOTHING, the result is NE.
HYPOTHETICAL 6: Paul wants to introduce the hearsay statement
of his sister, Donna DeKalb. Donna's location is well known: She is
overseas, beyond the subpoena power. The court believes that, if it
was important to Paul that Donna testify, he could persuade her to
do so. Otto, however, could not compel her to testify. The court is
inclined to admit Donna's statement, because it believes that the
statement is more probative than prejudicial 39 The court recog-
nizes, however, that if Otto had a chance to cross-examine Donna he
might be able to expose weaknesses in her story.
The court might impose on Paul the burden of persuading
Donna to come to court to testify. The court can do this by ruling
that, if Paul fails to report that Donna is willing to appear, the hear-
say is excluded. This potential consequence gives Paul an incentive to
persuade Donna to appear-assuming he has confidence that her tes-
timony will support him, and he believes that presenting her version
of events, whether by live testimony or hearsay, is important to him.
And the same potential consequence might also give Donna an incen-
tive to agree.
At the same time, the court might impose on Otto the burden of
arranging transportation for Donna. Under this ruling, if Donna does
express a willingness to appear, Otto will have to arrange to bring
Donna to court, and pay for the transportation, or else the hearsay
would be excluded. Otto would thus be required to decide whether in
fact he prefers that Donna testify live, subject to adverse questioning
39 See supra note 4.
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Figure 3b
Court
SPLIT
BURDEN
(OPPONENT
FIRST)
Opponent
DO NOTHIN N PART-PRODUCE
H
DO NOTHING PART-PRODUCE
NE LT
0' -$pp'
-$00,
by him, or that her hearsay statement be admitted-and whether he
prefers the live testimony sufficiently to be willing to pay for the costs
of transportation.
This solution, like those discussed in relation to Hypotheticals 3
and 4, is an example of SPLIT BURDEN (PROPONENT FIRST), because
the proponent is required to state whether or not he will bear his por-
tion of the burden before the opponent is required to commit or
perform.
HYPOTHETICAL 7: Albert Acker is the accused in a felony case.
The prosecution wants to introduce evidence of the out-of-court
statement of Della Deaver, a former collaborator of Acker's. The
court is able to satisfy itself that the statement is not excluded by
Acker's rights under the Confrontation Clause." The court is in-
clined to admit the statement, because it believes that the statement
is more probative than prejudicial,4" but it realizes that if it did so
Acker would not be able to compel Della to testify. The problem is
not bringing Della to court: She lives in a distant state, but either
party would be able to secure her presence pursuant to the Uniform
Act To Secure The Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in
Criminal Proceedings.4 2 Rather, the problem is that Della has
made clear, through counsel, that if called to testify she would claim
40 Under both the current doctrine, see supra note 8, and the theory suggested supra note 9,
there would not be a confrontation problem if Deaver made the statement to assist a conspir-
acy between her and Acker.
41 See supra note 4.
42 UNIF. ACT TO SECURE THE ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES § 3, 11 U.L.A. 17 (1974).
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her fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. There is
in fact a theoretical possibility that Deaver could be prosecuted, and
that her statement would be used against her. But it is highly un-
likely that she will be prosecuted, because her involvement in the
criminal enterprise was tangential at best. In any event, the state-
ment is at most mildly inculpatory of her.
The court might hold that, given the probative value of the state-
ment, Acker should bear the burden of producing Deaver as a wit-
ness-except that only the prosecution can induce her to testify. The
court might decide that the prosecutor has ample and reasonable
means of avoiding the fifth amendment problem. If Deaver were seri-
ously exposed to criminal liability, she and the prosecutor might pos-
sibly enter into a plea bargain; given that she is not, it would probably
be simplest to offer her immunity from the use of her testimony in any
prosecution of her. Thus, the court might impose on the prosecutor
the burden of eliminating the fifth amendment problem. That is, the
court might rule that the hearsay will be admitted unless the prosecu-
tion reports that it has granted Deaver immunity or that Deaver has
for some other reason agreed to testify.43 But, because the probative
value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial potential, the court
might impose on Acker the remaining portion of the burden of pro-
ducing Deaver. This means that, if the prosecution carries its burden,
so that Deaver is willing or compelled to testify, Acker would have to
arrange for Deaver to be brought to court, presumably through the
mechanism of the Uniform Act, or the hearsay would be excluded.'
The solution as presented here is an example of SPLIT BURDEN
(PROPONENT FIRST), because the proponent, the prosecution, is re-
quired to commit first before the opponent, the accused, is required to
commit or perform. But, as we shall now see, this sequence is not
inevitable.
43 In Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986), the four dissenters, discussing an issue not ad-
dressed by the majority, indicated that they would hold that the Confrontation Clause did not
preclude the prosecution from introducing a statement notwithstanding the fact that the prose-
cution had not used inducements available to it to persuade the declarant to waive a prospec-
tive claim of fifth amendment privilege and testify. Id. at 548 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Even
assuming, arguendo, that this position is valid as a matter of Confrontation Clause law, a
jurisdiction would remain free, as a matter of its ordinary hearsay law, to impose on the prose-
cution the burden of inducing a declarant to waive such a claim of privilege.
44 Another situation might warrant the same solution. Suppose the same facts as Hypo-
thetical 7, except for two changes. First, Acker, rather than the prosecution, offers Deaver's
statement. Second, the court believes that the statement is more prejudicial than probative. In
such a case, as in Hypothetical 7, it may make sense for the court to impose on the prosecution
the burden of nullifying the fifth amendment problem, and on the accused the remaining por-
tions of the burden of producing the declarant.
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2. Sequences, Consequences, and Sanctions
If the court decides to split the physical burden, it must go be-
yond merely allocating the burden. The court must also be concerned
with the sequence in which the parties will be called on to perform, or
to commit as to whether or not they will perform, their respective
tasks. Note that in each of the suggested decisions presented in con-
nection with the above hypotheticals, one party is first called on to
satisfy part of the burden of producing the declarant, or in some cases
merely to represent that he will satisfy that part if the other party
satisfies his share of the burden. The other party is then called on to
satisfy the remaining portions of the burden.
Usually, as in the solutions suggested for Hypotheticals 3
through 5, the portions of the burden must be satisfied in the natural
chronological sequence; the declarant must be identified and located
before she can be brought to court. But this is not always true. In
Hypothetical 7, for example, the portion of the burden imposed on the
prosecution--eliminating the fifth amendment problem-might be
performed before, after, or even during, the opponent's performance
of his portion of the burden. Similarly, in Hypothetical 6, the oppo-
nent might perform some aspects of the burden imposed on him, such
as arranging for transportation, before the proponent performs the
portion imposed on him, persuading the declarant to travel to testify.
In these cases, efficiency considerations may weigh in favor of one
sequence over another, but no given sequence is logically mandated.
Whatever may be the sequence in which the parties are required
to perform their respective shares of the burden, it need not be the
same as the sequence in which they are required to commit as to
whether or not they will perform. The latter sequence, moreover, is
not subject to the same logical constraints that may apply to the for-
mer. Sometimes, it is appropriate for the court to call on one party to
commit as to whether or not he will satisfy one aspect of the burden
before the other party is called on to satisfy, or even to commit with
respect to, a chronologically earlier aspect.45
Such an alteration of sequence may be valuable in preventing
needless cost or effort. Thus, in Hypothetical 7, it makes no sense for
45 Suppose that the burden of identifying the declarant is imposed on the proponent and
that all other aspects of the burden of producing her are imposed on the opponent. The propo-
nent's portion must be performed first. But there are these possible sequences:
1. Proponent performs (or not); if proponent performs, then opponent performs (or
not).
2. Opponent commits (or not); if opponent commits, then proponent performs (or not);
if proponent performs, then opponent performs (or not).
3. Proponent commits (or not); if proponent commits, then opponent commits (or not);
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Acker to go to the difficulty and expense of having Deaver brought to
trial if in fact Deaver will claim the fifth amendment privilege and the
prosecution will not induce her to testify. Acker should not be re-
quired to perform, at least, until after the prosecution has committed.
Correspondingly, the court might well be reluctant to induce the pros-
ecutor to enter into plea negotiations with Deaver or to grant her use
immunity unless it knows that, assuming the fifth amendment prob-
lem is eliminated, Acker will indeed bring Deaver to trial. The court
might rule that, before the prosecution is actually called on to take
steps to induce Deaver to testify, Acker must commit himself to pro-
duce Deaver.
The choice of sequence may affect not only the costs incurred by
the parties, but also the evidentiary consequence. Suppose the court is
able to avoid waste by not calling on either party to spend any signifi-
cant effort or expense in performing his portion of the burden until
the other party has committed to satisfying his portion. The sequence
in which the parties are required to commit-which, as noted above,
is a different matter from the sequence in which they are required to
perform46-is still potentially important. This may become apparent
by comparing figures 3a and 3b, which presented the PROPONENT
FIRST and OPPONENT FIRST versions, respectively, of SPLIT
BURDEN.
Note that, given a choice between these two procedures, each
if opponent commits, then proponent performs (or not); if proponent performs, then opponent
performs (or not).
4. The parties commit (or not) simultaneously; if both commit, then proponent performs
(or not); if proponent performs, then opponent performs (or not).
Note that sequence 2 is the same as sequence I with one extra step (the opponent's choice)
tacked on at the beginning, and that sequence 3 is the same as sequence 2 with another extra
step (the proponent's choice) tacked on at the beginning. Sequence 4 is the same as sequence 1
with a different extra step (simultaneous commitment, as suggested in the text infra at 913).
Sequences 1 and 3 are PROPONENT FIRST sequences, because the proponent is called on
at least to commit before the opponent is called on to commit or perform. Sequence 2 is an
OPPONENT FIRST sequence because, although the proponent performs before the opponent,
the opponent is first called on to commit. In the terms used infra 913-15, sequence 4 is a
SIMULTANEOUS MOVES sequence.
If the assumption made at the beginning of this footnote-that the proponent performs
before the opponent-is reversed, a different set of four possible sequences, corresponding to
the four set out above (but with the parties switched in each case), is available. Two of these
are OPPONENT FIRST sequences, one is a PROPONENT FIRST sequence, and one is a SIMULTA-
NEOUS MOVES sequence. (For example, the solution suggested in connection with Hypotheti-
cal 5 is the simplest form of OPPONENT FIRST sequence: opponent performs (or not); if
opponent performs, then proponent performs.)
In some cases, as suggested in the text, it is not necessary that one party perform all of his
portion of the burden before the other party performs all of his portion. Sometimes, then, an
infinite number of sequences may be possible.
46 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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party should hope that the other is required to decide first, because
this ordering will make a difference if neither party is inclined to per-
form the portion of the burden that the court imposes on it. If the
court requires the proponent to commit first and the proponent
chooses Do NOTHING, the result is NE, the result desired by the oppo-
nent, without the opponent ever having to commit. On the other
hand, if the opponent must move first and chooses Do NOTHING, the
result is H, which the proponent desires, and the proponent never has
to commit.
Figure 3c
Court
SPLIT
BURDEN
(SIMULTANEOUS
MOVES)
Opponent
Proponent Proponent
c0 NOin PT PART-PRODUCE,
PRODUCE
H NE LT
-$00,
H NE
0 0
If this asymmetry appears potentially troublesome, the court
might choose a third procedure, SPLIT BURDEN (SIMULTANEOUS
MOVES), pictured in Figure 3c. This diagram portrays the opponent
as moving first, but effective simultaneity is represented by the dotted
line around the two proponent nodes, which indicates that the propo-
nent does not know which move the opponent has made."7 It could
be, for example, that both parties submit their choices to the court
under seal. (Reversing the order, showing the proponent moving first
but with dotted lines around the two opponent nodes, would also indi-
cate effective simultaneity.) If both parties choose PART-PRODUCE,
47 E. Rasmusen, supra note 11, at 46-47. Sequence 4 in note 45 is one SIMULTANEOUS
MOVES sequence. The other is: the parties commit (or not) simultaneously; if both commit,
then opponent performs (or not); if opponent performs, then proponent performs (or not).
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then, just as under the PROPONENT FIRST and OPPONENT FIRST ver-
sions of SPLIT BURDEN, the declarant is produced and testifies live. If
one party decides to PART PRODUCE but the other decides to Do
NOTHING, the party whose inaction causes the declarant's absence
suffers an adverse evidentiary result-H for the opponent, NE for the
proponent. But if both parties decide to DO NOTHING, the choice re-
verts to the court, which now knows that only H and NE, and not LT,
are available outcomes. In such a situation, for reasons discussed in
the sequel to this article, the court should choose H if, as I believe is
usually the case, the hearsay seems more probative than prejudicial,
and NE if the reverse appears to be true.48
Note that, ,iven this rule for the court's decision, the SIMULTA-
NEOUS MOVES variation of SPLIT BURDEN becomes essentially the
equivalent of the OPPONENT FIRST variation when the hearsay is
more probative than prejudicial.49 Similar logic shows that, under the
same rule of decision, when the hearsay is more prejudicial than pro-
bative the SIMULTANEOUS MOVES and PROPONENT FIRST variations
are essentially identical. This may suggest that, if the court wants to
avoid the extra complexity of the SIMULTANEOUS MOVES variation, it
should simply pick the OPPONENT FIRST variation if the hearsay is
more probative than prejudicial and the PROPONENT FIRST variation
if the reverse is true. There is one further complication, however.
In some ca,;es, a party's decision as to whether or not to satisfy
his portion of the burden may give some indication as to whether the
hearsay is more probative than prejudicial. Suppose the court believes
that the evidence is indeed more probative than prejudicial, but it im-
poses part of th-. burden on the proponent because he can perform
that part of the burden with minimum effort and the opponent could
not, at least not without great effort; Hypothetical 4-in which the
court might impose on Propco the burden of providing Oppco with
the declarant's last known address, information readily at hand for
Propco but not !'or Oppco-is an example of such a case. In such a
situation, given that the burden imposed on the proponent is so mi-
48 Analysis of Hearsay, supra note 2; see also supra note 4.
49 This can be demonstrated by examining under each variation what happens if the oppo-
nent chooses Do NOTHING, and then what happens if he chooses his other alternative, PART-
PRODUCE. Under either variation, if the opponent chooses DO NOTHING, the hearsay is ad-
mitted. Under the SIMULTANEOUS MOVES variation, assuming the proposed rule of decision,
this is the result that prevails whether the proponent chooses PART-PRODUCE or DO NOTH-
ING. And under the OPPONENT FIRST variation, if the opponent chooses Do NOTHING the
proponent is never asl:ed what he wants to do. Under either variation, if the opponent picks
PART-PRODUCE then the result will be LT if the proponent chooses PART-PRODUCE and NE if
the proponent chooses NE. Thus, under the stated assumptions, the results yielded by the two
variations are identical to each other for all possible combinations of the parties' moves.
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nuscule, if the proponent nevertheless fails to satisfy that part of the
burden, it appears that, although he would have liked to introduce the
hearsay, he prefers no evidence at all from the declarant to her live
testimony. And this strongly suggests that the hearsay would in fact
be more prejudicial than probative.50 The OPPONENT FIRST varia-
tion would deny the court this information if the opponent chooses
Do NOTHING. It is better in such a case to require the proponent to
commit himself before, or at the same time as, the opponent. Simi-
larly, if the burden imposed on the opponent is minuscule, it is better
to require the opponent to commit himself no later than the time the
proponent does.5'
These considerations suggest the following, slightly more compli-
cated, rule of thumb for a court choosing among variations of SPLIT
BURDEN. If the burden imposed on one party is trivial, require that
party to commit first. Where each party would have to bear a sub-
stantial burden, select the OPPONENT FIRST variation if the hearsay
appears more probative than prejudicial, and the PROPONENT FIRST
variation if the reverse is true. In doubtful cases, or where the extra
effort seems worthwhile, choose the SIMULTANEOUS MOVES
variation.
Note that under either the PROPONENT FIRST or OPPONENT
FIRST versions of SPLIT BURDEN, if a party chooses to DO NOTHING
he guarantees an adverse evidentiary result-the result that he fought
the hearsay issue to avoid. Similarly, under the SIMULTANEOUS
MOVES version, each party knows that choosing DO NOTHING risks
the adverse result. No further sanction is ordinarily needed, because
the adverse result-H for the opponent, NE for the proponent-is also
50 The proponent apparently perceives that the hearsay would tend to persuade the jury in
his favor and that the live testimony would tend to persuade the jury against him. Assume this
is correct. It means that, if the hearsay is admitted, it will tend to move the jury in the oppo-
site direction from that in which the jury would move if it had more information, in the form
of live testimony of the declarant. Perhaps, for instance, the proponent knows that if the
declarant testified live she would likely not adhere to the prior statement.
On the other hand, in rare cases it may be that there would be some prejudicial quality to
the live testimony that the hearsay would avoid. Suppose the declarant has some readily ap-
parent handicap that, both the proponent and the court fear, would tend unreasonably to make
the jury believe she is not a credible witness. In such a case, the court might agree with the
proponent that, even putting aside the burden of producing the declarant, the hearsay is prefer-
able to the live testimony.
51 If the opponent declines to satisfy a trivial burden, it means that he would rather the
hearsay be admitted than that the declarant testify live. This appears to demonstrate that, at
least in his view, the evidence is more probative than prejudicial; it is not as powerful as, but it
points in the same direction as, the live testimony. If the proponent had to commit first, the
court would be deprived of this reading of the opponent's perception.
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the result that his adversary fought the hearsay motion to achieve.52
Even if a party, having committed to PART-PRODUCE, fails in bad
faith to satisfy his portion of the burden, often no sanction is neces-
sary; the failure to perform will lead to an adverse evidentiary result,
and will have gained the party nothing. Sometimes, though, if a party
goes to substantial effort or expense in reliance on his adversary's
commitment to satisfy part of the burden, a sanction for failure to
perform would be appropriate.
3. Good Faith and the Ability to Perform
Because it is simpler to impose the entire physical burden on one
party rather than to split it, the burden ought only to be split when
there is good reason to do so. Often, the reason for splitting is that
one party has a significant advantage over the other in performing
part of the burden, but there is some reason-perhaps fairness, per-
haps efficiency--why the other party ought to bear remaining por-
tions of the burden. In Hypothetical 3, for instance, because it
appears that only Propco can efficiently determine the name and ad-
dress of the declarant, the court might conclude that this part of the
burden should be borne by Propco. But, because the memo appears
more probative than prejudicial, the court might be inclined to impose
on Oppco those aspects of the burden of producing the declarant as to
which Propco does not have a substantial advantage.5 3
A problem may arise, however. The court is imposing part of the
burden on Propco only because it believes that Propco can satisfy that
portion of the burden more efficiently than Oppco can. But what if
the court is wrong, and by far? That is, what if it turns out that
Propco cannot determine the name and address of the declarant at all,
at least not with ut great difficulty and expense? Then, imposing on
Propco the burden of identifying and locating the declarant amounts
in effect to excluding the hearsay. But this, by the hypothesis of the
problem, was nct the court's intention. The court intended only to
induce Propco to facilitate the production of the declarant, assuming
the opponent found it worthwhile to produce her; the court did not
intend to hold that, if the declarant was effectively incapable of being
produced, the hearsay ought to be excluded.
At least two basic approaches to this problem are possible. One
52 Even if both parties choose PART-PRODUCE and then one party fails to make good on
his commitment, providing for the evidentiary result adverse to that party would often be
sufficient sanction. But if the other party incurred substantial expense by performing his part
of the performance in eliance on the commitment, it might be necessary for that party to be
compensated, at least if the first party's failure to meet his commitment was in bad faith.
53 See Analysis of -earsay, supra note 2.
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approach would attempt to prevent situations in which the dilemma
might arise. Thus, in deciding whether or not to impose on a party a
given portion of the burden of producing the declarant, the court
would not consider the party's apparent advantage over his adversary
in satisfying that portion of the burden unless the following prerequi-
site is met: the court must be confident to a high degree that the party
can indeed satisfy that portion of the burden, and can do so without
undue difficulty or exorbitant expense.
Another approach would be to deal with the problem after it
arises by inquiring into the causes for the party's failure to satisfy the
portion of the burden assigned to him. Under this approach, if the
party tried and failed in good faith, then, to the extent that this por-
tion of the burden was imposed on him only because of his presumed
advantage in satisfying it, he should be relieved of it. Put another
way, the burden imposed on a party might be deemed to be merely to
make a good faith effort to achieve a designated portion of the job of
producing the declarant. Under this approach, if the court deter-
mined that Propco's failure to identify and locate its employee was in
good faith, the hearsay would be admitted; if Propco failed to make a
good faith effort, however, the hearsay would be excluded.
Both of these approaches are necessary in part; neither is entirely
adequate. It would be unwise for the court willy-nilly to assume that
a given party can satisfy part of the production burden, and then have
to either tolerate an unintended evidentiary result or inquire into the
party's good faith when the party fails to perform. Perhaps, in Hypo-
thetical 3, Propco cannot determine who the memo-writing employee
was after all; perhaps, in Hypothetical 6, Paul simply cannot persuade
his sister to testify, even if her refusal hurts him dearly in the litiga-
tion. On the other hand, no matter how careful a court tries to be, in
some instances its confident prediction that a party can perform a des-
ignated portion of the burden of production will be unfounded. If a
court is too stringent in demanding absolute certainty before it is will-
ing to act on the assumption that a given party is able to satisfy effi-
ciently part of the burden of producing the declarant, the court will be
denying itself an effective device for resolving hearsay issues. Courts
should be willing to tolerate the necessity of making an occasional
inquiry into good faith.
B., Separating the Physical and Financial Burdens
In each of the hypotheticals presented in Section A, the solution
presented involves some split of the physical burden of producing the
declarant. In some circumstances, a different type of division would
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be appropriate, a division in which one party bears the entire financial
burden and the other bears the entire physical burden. Consider the
hypotheticals that follow in this Section.
HYPOTHETICAL 8: Same facts as Hypothetical 3, in which Propco
wishes to introduce a memorandum apparently made by one of its
employees, *ith these additions: The memo is an entry in a comput-
erized record. Propco can determine who the author of the memo is
only after a search, which will require a more than trivial amount of
staff time and some high-priced computer time. Only Propco em-
ployees couhl efficiently conduct the search. Propco's sole place of
business is located in Courthouse City, and the memo was written
only one year before the time of the trial; thus, once the author of the
memo is ideitified, she could presumably be produced as a witness
without difficulty.
In these circumstances, it might make sense for the court to im-
pose the entire physical burden of producing the declarant on Propco.
The declarant can be identified, at least efficiently, only by Propco,
and identifying the declarant is in all probability the only difficult and
expensive aspect of producing her. But the court might decide that,
because the hec.rsay statement appears more probative than prejudi-
cial, the expense of producing the declarant should not be incurred
unless Oppco is willing to bear it. That is, the court might impose on
Oppco the financial burden of producing the declarant.
Figure 3d
00 NOTHING PRODUCE
OPONNTSLur
01 -sop
I will label this procedure, in which the physical burden is placed
on the proponent and the financial burden is placed on the opponent,OPPONENT'S OPTION. The procedure is 
presented in Figure 3d as
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another possible subgame beginning with the court's decision on the
hearsay motion. Under this procedure, as under ADMIT, if the oppo-
nent decides to DO NOTHING, the hearsay is admitted; also as under
ADMIT, the opponent may, if it is feasible and he wants to do so, PRO-
DUCE the decldrant as a witness. But now the opponent has another
option as well: He may DEMAND that the proponent physically pro-
duce the declarant. If the proponent does PRODUCE her, the declar-
ant gives live testimony (evidentiary result LT) and the opponent pays
compensation to the proponent, determined by the court absent agree-
ment by the parties; hence the notation Sop, indicating that the oppo-
nent pays the proponent's cost of producing the declarant. If,
however, the proponent fails to produce the declarant (Do NOTHING),
the hearsay is excluded (evidentiary result NE). As in the hypotheti-
cals in section A, no further sanction is ordinarily needed, because
excluding the hearsay gives the opponent what he sought by making
the objection. Also as in those hypotheticals, occasionally an inquiry
into good faith may be necessary, if Propco contends that in fact it
cannot produce the declarant, at least not without great difficulty.
HYPOTHETICAL 9: Propco decides on the eve of trial that it wants to
introduce a statement by Danielle Denver, one of its customers from
a distant state. Danielle is, and has been, willing to testify in Court-
house City, if necessary, so long as she can arrive and leave within 24
hours; she does not do supersavers. The problem is that, because the
time is so short, it is not certain that transportation for her can be
arranged in time. The court would have chosen ADMIT had Propco
given more notice, because it believes that the statement is more pro-
bative than prejudicial,54 but it accepts Oppco's representation that
Oppco wishes to subject Danielle to adverse questioning. The Court
believes there is a plausible chance that such questioning might yield
benefits for Oppco.
Here again OPPONENT'S OPTION appears to be a plausible rul-
ing. Had Propco given adequate notice, the court would have im-
posed the financial and physical burdens on Oppco. Propco's delay
does not seem to have increased the financial burden; that is, bringing
Danielle to court does not seem to be substantially more expensive
than it would have been had Propco given more notice. Thus, the
financial burden should probably still rest with Oppco, meaning that
the hearsay will be admitted unless Oppco indicates that it will pay
for the costs of bringing Danielle to court. But the delay has made
the physical burden greater: it is less certain that Danielle will be able
to appear in time at all. The court might regard it as appropriate that
54 See supra note 4.
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this risk be put on Propco; if Oppco indicates willingness to pay the
costs of transportation, then the hearsay will be excluded unless
Propco manages to bring Danielle to court in time. Propco, in other
words, bears the risk created by its delay.
Note that here, unlike Hypothetical 8, the physical burden is im-
posed on Propco not because of its presumed advantage in producing
the declarant, but rather because of Propco's delay. Hence, in this
case, if Propco cannot in fact produce her, no inquiry into its good
faith in trying ;hould be necessary; if Propco cannot produce her de-
spite good faith efforts, that is its tough luck.
HYPOTHETICAL 10: Propco wants to introduce a statement by one
of its sales staff, Dana Drew. It gave notice of its intention to do so
well before trial, but as the trial began Oppco decided that it did not
want to let Drew's statement be introduced without submitting her to
adverse questioning. Drew had been in Courthouse City for months,
but shortly before trial she began a sales trip to a distant state.
Oppco cann 9t subpoena her quickly, nor is it feasible to arrange a
deposition where Drew is. Propco could arrange to fly her back in
time to testi'fy, if necessary, but the flight would be expensive: No
supersavers are available on such short notice.
Once more OPPONENT'S OPTION appears to be a plausible rul-
ing, though for different reasons. It seems fair for Oppco to bear the
financial burden of bringing Drew in to testify, if for no other reason
than that, but for its delay in objecting to the hearsay, there would
have been no expense in bringing Dana in to testify. On the other
hand, Oppco cannot physically produce Drew, but there appears to be
no reason why Propco cannot.5 Under this ruling, then, if Oppco
decides not to pay for producing Drew, the hearsay is admitted. If
Oppco decides to pay, but Propco does not produce her, the hearsay is
excluded. And if Oppco decides to pay and Propco produces her,
Oppco pays Propco the costs that Propco incurs in bringing her in,
determined by the court if the parties are unable to agree.
HYPOTHETICAL 11: Propco wants to introduce a statement by an
employee of Oppco's, Diane Dewitt. Had Propco given adequate no-
tice of this .fact, it would have been a simple matter for Oppco to
produce her, because she was stationed in Courthouse City. And
presumably Oppco would have produced her; according to a faxed
affidavit by her submitted by Oppco, her statement was not intended
to mean what Propco says it meant. But now Dewitt is in Oppco's
outpost in Wildernessville. Oppco could bring her back in time to
55 If there is substantial doubt about Propco's ability to bring Drew in, the court might
hesitate to adopt this ruling, unless it is willing to engage in an examination as to Propco's
good faith in the event that Propco does fail to bring her in. See, supra pp. 905-10.
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testify, if necessary, but it would have to send the company jet to
fetch her.
This is virtually the reverse of Hypothetical 10, and the reverse
result, PROPONENT'S OPTION, may be called for: because Propco's
delay in giving notice created the expense of producing Dewitt,
Propco ought to bear the financial burden. But only Oppco can sat-
isfy the physical burden, or, at least, only it can do so efficiently.
Under PROPONENT'S OPTION, as under EXCLUDE, if Propco does
nothing the hearsay is excluded; also as under EXCLUDE, the propo-
nent may, where it is feasible, physically produce the declarant him-
self. But now the proponent has the extra option of demanding that
the opponent produce the declarant in return for compensation,
which would be determined by court order if the parties do not agree
on it. Failure by Oppco to produce the declarant would result in ad-
mission of the hearsay; again, no further sanction would be needed,
because this would give Propco what it sought by introducing the
hearsay.
Figure 3e
PROPONENT'SO
- DEMAND
Proponent
DO NOTHING 
_ PRODUCE
NE LT
"$PP Opponent
DO NOTHING PRODUCE
H LT
0$0
PROPONENT'S OPTION is pictured in Figure 3e. Note that this
diagram is, in a sense, the mirror image of Figure 3d: Figure 3e may
be derived fr9m Figure 3d by switching OPPONENT with PROPO-
NENT, subscript o with subscript p, and evidentiary result H with evi-
dentiary result NE.
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C. Other Possible Burden-Splitting Arrangements in Response to a
Hearsay Objection
Section A of this Part suggested that in some circumstances it
makes sense to divide between the parties the burden of performing
the various tasks of producing the declarant. And Section B sug-
gested that in some circumstances it makes sense to divide the burden
along another dimension, imposing the financial burden on one party
and the physical burden on the other. These cross-cuts do not ex-
haust the possibilities of burden splitting. For example, it would be
possible to combine the two cuts, imposing on one party part of the
physical burden, or part of the financial burden, and on the other
party all the remaining portions of the burden of producing the
declarant.
HYPOTHETICAL 12: Same facts as Hypothetical 8, in which Propco
seeks to intioduce a computerized memorandum evidently written
by an unidentified employee, but with these changes: Once Propco
identifies the declarant, it may still be difficult to produce her, be-
cause the memo is five years old and Propco's place of business is in
another stat,., far from Courthouse City.
In this case, the court might impose on Propco only the physical
burden of identifying the declarant, but impose on Oppco the remain-
ing portions of the physical burden and the entire financial burden of
producing the declarant. That is, the court might decide in this par-
ticular case tha t the proponent should be responsible for performing
the task that only it can do efficiently, but that in general the oppo-
nent should bear the burden of producing the declarant-including
the burden of payment for the physical tasks performed by both the
proponent and the opponent.
HYPOTHETICAL 13: Same facts as Hypothetical 11, in which
Propco give,. belated notice of its intention to offer a statement by
Oppco's employee Dewitt, except that Dewitt ordinarily is stationed
in Wildernessville; had Propco given earlier notice of its intention to
use the statement, she could have been brought to trial more
cheaply, bu,. the expense still would have been substantiaL
If, supposing that notice had been adequate, the court would
have imposed on Propco the financial burden of producing Dewitt,
Propco's lateness in giving notice should only fortify that result. If,
on the other hand, the court would have imposed on Oppco the bur-
den of bringing the declarant in, it might alter that ruling merely by
imposing on Fropco the incremental financial burden caused by its
delay. That is, Oppco would bear the entire physical burden of pro-
ducing her and the hypothetical expenses it would have incurred had
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it produced her after receiving adequate notice from Propco. If
Oppco did produce her, Propco would have to pay Oppco the excess
of its actual costs over those hypothetical costs. Propco should also
have an opportunity to decide that, rather than pay that difference, it
would prefer doing without evidence from Dewitt altogether,56 but of
course it should have to make this decision before Oppco incurs any
substantial expense or difficulty.
Other variations on burden-splitting in response to a hearsay ob-
jection are possible, but I will not attempt to catalogue them all.
D. Splitting the Burdens Before the Hearsay Issue is Posed
Sections A through C of this Part deal with the situation in
which the hearsay issue has already been posed to the court. That is,
the proponent has already chosen OFFER over PRODUCE and DO
NOTHING, and the opponent has chosen OBJECT over PRODUCE and
Do NOTHING. Thus, the proponent has decided that he prefers
presenting the hearsay to either presenting the live testimony of the
declarant-at least if he would have to bear the entire burden of pro-
ducing the declarant-or presenting no evidence at all from the de-
clarant. And the opponent has already decided that he prefers no
evidence at all from the declarant to either producing the declarant
himself or to allowing the declarant's hearsay statement to be admit-
ted without subjecting the declarant to adverse questioning.
But now let us take another step backward. In some circum-
stances, offering the hearsay is the second best alternative for the pro-
ponent; he may prefer to offer the declarant's live testimony, if the
opponent will carry at least part of the physical burden of producing
the declarant.
HYPOTHETICAL 14: Another variation on Hypothetical 11: Oppco's
employee, Diane Dewitt, who at the moment is in Wildernessville,
has made a statement favorable to Propco. If necessary, Propco will
offer the statement, and the court would in all probability admit it.
Shortly before trial, though, Propco decides that it would prefer to
present Dewitt's live testimony, for it believes that this would be far
more compelling than repetition by another witness of her hearsay
statement. But only with great difficulty, if at all, could Propco
serve a subpoena on Dewitt in time for her to testify. Oppco could, if
necessary, arrange for Dewitt's presence in time to testify; it is reluc-
tant to do so, however, because it would really prefer that she not
testify.
In this case, rather than offering the hearsay, Propco might ask
56 See supra note 36.
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for what I shall call EARLY OPTION. Under this procedure, as under
PROPONENT'S OPTION, the financial burden is imposed on the propo-
nent and the physical burden on the opponent. This allocation ap-
pears to make sense in this case. It is Propco that wants Dewitt to
testify, and perhaps Propco's delay has caused an increase in the costs
of arranging hc:r appearance, so it is appropriate for Propco to pay for
Dewitt to appear. Only Oppco, however, can efficiently arrange De-
witt's appearance. Thus, it appears appropriate for Oppco to bear the
physical burdeA of bringing her in.
There is one significant problem here that was not present in Hy-
pothetical 11, in which Propco wished to introduce the hearsay state-
ment rather than Dewitt's live testimony. In Hypothetical 11, if
Propco exercis,-.d its option and demanded production of Dewitt but
Oppco failed to produce her, admitting the hearsay was a sufficient
sanction, becau.se that gave Propco all it had a right to expect when it
offered the hearsay. But in Hypothetical 14, Propco's request for
EARLY OPTIOr' shows that it prefers live testimony to hearsay. Corre-
spondingly, Oppco prefers the hearsay to live testimony, and may re-
alize that the court prefers the hearsay to no evidence at all from
Dewitt. Thus, although it is appropriate, it is not a sufficiefnt remedy
to provide thai:, if Propco demands production of the declarant but
Oppco fails to produce her, the hearsay will be admitted; admission of
the hearsay without the declarant's live testimony is the best result
that Oppco can reasonably hope for, and the worst that Propco
should reasonably fear. Some additional sanction may be necessary to
ensure that the opponent will not frustrate the court's objective by a
bad faith failure to produce the declarant.57
57 Thus, once again, an inquiry into good faith may sometimes be necessary. Need for such
an inquiry was also possible with respect to most of the hypotheticals presented in Sections A
through C of this Part, but there the role of the inquiry was different. There, the proponent
sought to introduce hearsay rather than live testimony. Under the suggested rulings, the court
imposed all or part of the physical burden of producing the declarant on one party because of
that party's presumed advantage in satisfying that portion of the burden. The court did not
order the party to s.tisfy that portion of the burden, but merely provided that he would suffer
an adverse evidentiary result if he did not satisfy it. Occasionally, I argued, that party might
contend that in fact it could not satisfy the designated portion of the burden, at least not
efficiently, and in such a case the court's incorrect perception that the party could perform that
portion should not c.ause the party to suffer an adverse evidentiary result. Thus, an inquiry
into that party's good faith might occasionally be necessary.
In the present c'ontext, by contrast, under the suggested ruling the court does order the
opponent to satisfy all or part of the physical burden of producing the declarant, because the
court and the proponent would both prefer live testimony to hearsay, and only the opponent
can efficiently produ--e the declarant. A good faith inquiry may be necessary because the oppo-
nent contends that he ought to be excused from that order, and from the sanctions that would
normally follow failure to obey, on the ground that in fact it is difficult or impossible for him to
produce the declara at.
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Figure 3f presents the possibility of EARLY OPTION as a subgame
beginning with the proponent's first move. In addition to his choices
of producing the declarant (if he can), offering the hearsay, or doing
without any evidence from the declarant, the proponent may choose
ASK FOR EARLY OPTION. If the court chooses to GRANT the request,
the opponent may comply by producing the declarant; the notation
-$P0 indicates that the proponent pays the opponent's cost of produc-
tion. If in response to GRANT the opponent does not produce the
declarant, the hearsay is admitted and some additional sanction is im-
posed on the opponent. If the court chooses to DENY the request, the
proponent is thrown back to his other choices of PRODUCE, OFFER,
and Do NOTHING. The notation START OVER is a shorthand to indi-
cate that the proponent again faces his initial choices, but without
EARLY OPTION as a possibility.
Figure 3f
Proponent
ASK FOR
EARLY
OPTION
CTONLSO
Court
RANT 
DENY
Opponent Start OverRODUCE 
DO NOTHING
LT H
Sanction
CONCLUSION
Much of this article's message is suggested by Figure 4. Thisdiagram strongly resembles Figure 1, but with two important
changes.
First, LT* is replaced everywhere by LT, indicating that if the
declarant testifies then, however she may have been produced, she
should ordinarily be first questioned by the proponent and then by the
opponent. When the declarant is being examined by the proponent, it
is generally best that she be asked for her current testimony of the
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underlying event or condition before the admissibility of the hearsay
statement is detided.
Second, Figure 4 incorporates by reference Figures 3a through
3f, thus indicating extra choices that the court has. At the outset, if
the proponent prefers live testimony to hearsay but the opponent is
substantially better able to produce the declarant, the court might-
before the hearsay issue is even posed-grant EARLY OPTION, thus
allocating to the opponent the physical burden of producing the de-
clarant and to the proponent the financial burden. If the proponent
offers the hearsay and the opponent objects, the court is not limited to
the choices of ADMIT and EXCLUDE in resolving the issue. It may also
split the burden of production in the ways represented in Figures 3a
through 3e-and in other ways not pictured.
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I have not tried in this article to present a comprehensive theory
of how a court should resolve hearsay disputes. Nor, for that matter,
have I attempted to analyze systematically the criteria the court
should use in deciding when, and how, to split the burden of produc-
tion. I hope to make some progress towards those ends in the sequel
to this article.58 In this article, I have tried to make two basic points.
First, however the court might rule initially on the hearsay issue, and
however the declarant may be produced as a witness, if she does tes-
tify she ordinarily ought to be examined first by the proponent, and
she ordinarily ought to give her current testimony before admissibility
of the hearsay statement is decided. Second, allocation of the burden
of producing the declarant is a complex matter that admits of more
than two possible solutions. In some circumstances, the burden may
be beneficially split between the parties. Courts and rulemakers bear-
ing these procedural points in mind will be better able to improve the
administration of hearsay law.
58 Analysis of Hearsay, supra note 2.
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